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Abstract
The nancial labor supply accelerator links hours worked to minimum down pay-
ments for durable good purchases. When these constrain a household's debt, a per-
sistent wage increase generates a liquidity shortage. This limits the income eect, so
hours worked grow. The mechanism generates a positive comovement of labor supply
and household debt, the strength of which depends positively on the minimum down-
payment rate. Its potential macroeconomic importance comes from these labor supply
uctuations' procyclicality. This paper examines the comovement of hours worked and
debt at the household level with PSID data|before and after the nancial deregulation
of the early 1980s which reduced eective down payments|and compares the evidence
with results from model-generated data. The household-level data displays positive co-
movement between hours worked and debt, which weakens after the nancial reforms.
An empirically realistic reduction of the model's required down payments generates a
quantitatively similar weakening.
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In the standard model of labor supply based on intertemporal substitution, temporary wage
increases expand both labor supply and assets. Hence, one might hypothesize that households
repay debt when labor supply is high. Figure 1 examines this prediction with aggregate data
and shows the opposite: Household debt (including mortgages and automobile loans) deated
by the chain-weighted price index for GDP and aggregate hours, both HP-ltered, display a
clear and strong positive comovement.
Figure 1 suggests that the standard model of labor supply fails to characterize house-
holds' use of nancial markets over the business cycle. In this paper, we present a model that
generates positive comovement between hours worked and household debt with occasionally-
binding minimum down-payment requirements for purchases of durable goods. These mo-
tivate households to raise labor supply when increasing debt. We denote the resulting ex-
pansion of hours worked the nancial labor supply accelerator. To assess its empirical cred-
ibility, we calibrate the model's parameters and compare its predictions with observations
of household choices from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We nd that the positive
comovement of hours worked and debt manifests itself in within households across years even
after controlling for household xed eects and calendar-year eects. The calibrated model
economy quantitatively reproduces this. In the data, the connection between the two vari-
ables weakens after the nancial reforms of the 1980's. An empirically realistic reduction of
the model's required down payments generates a quantitatively similar weakening.
The model embodies two salient features of most household debt in the U.S.: durable
goods serve as collateral, and new borrowing requires a minimum down payment. When the
minimum down-payment constraint binds, a persistent wage increase generates a shortage of
funds to nance the desired durable goods purchases. In the nancial accelerator models of
Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999); credit-market imperfections amplify the uctuations of borrowing-constrained rms'
demand for factors of production. Unlike with rms, a shortage of household funds expands
economic activity. Nevertheless, the traditional nancial accelerator and that we consider
here can complement one another. A persistent technology shock that increases rms' earn-
ings and thereby triggers the traditional nancial accelerator, should also raise wages. Then,
the nancial labor supply accelerator ensures that a given wage increase brings forth more
hours worked. This labor supply response further raises output and strengthens the tra-





































































































2When the down-payment rate exactly equals the user cost of durable goods { as dened
by Jorgenson (1963){ then our model draws no meaningful distinction between nondurable
consumption goods and the service ow of durable goods. Hence, there is no nancial labor
supply accelerator. In general, reducing required down payments weakens the accelerator,
so periods of \easy credit" should display weaker comovement between hours worked and
household debt. In fact, the comovement between the two series in Figure 1 weakened
noticeably after the early 1980s. Their correlation before 1983:I is 0:86, and it equals 0:51
thereafter. This coincides with the comprehensive deregegulation of household credit markets
brought about by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982.
As documented in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009b), required down payments on durable
goods (particularly on owner-occupied homes) fell substantially in the wake of deregulation.
As noted above, we show in this paper that the household-level comovement of hours worked
and debt fell at about this time.
We are not the rst to study the association between labor supply and household debt.
Fortin (1995) found a positive contribution of the outstanding mortgage balance to Canadian
female-labor force participation rates. Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) studied the link between
mortgage markets and female labor force participation in Italy following a nancial liberaliza-
tion that lowered required down payments for mortgages in 1992. Comparing 1989 to 1993,
they found higher female participation along with a sharp increase in the proportion of new
homeowners with a mortgage. These observations are consistent with our model's long-run
predictions for labor supply following a permanent reduction in required down payments.
We build on these previous empirical results in three ways. First, we use observations from
the frequently-studied U.S. economy. Second, we use panel data covering years both before
and after nancial deregulation to examine how the comovement between work and debt
changes within a household over time. Finally, we compare our empirical results with those
constructed from data generated by a quantitative model of the nancial labor supply accel-
erator. When calibrated using actual down-payment rates from before and after the early
1980s, model-generated simulations mimic the level of comovement between hours worked
and debt and its change following credit market deregulation well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and dis-
cusses its primary theoretical predictions. In Section 3, we calibrate the model and compute
its impulse responses. In the calibration, we pay particular attention to the down-payment
rates and the parameters of the exogenous wage process. These match down payments from
observed loan contracts and the evolution of labor earnings in the PSID as reported by
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). The impulse responses quantitatively illustrate the theoretical
3predictions of Section 2. Section 4 documents the comovement of hours worked and mortgage
debt in the PSID data and its changes over time. It then compares these results with those
from data generated by the calibrated model. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the
nancial labor supply accelerator's potential macroeconomic implications.
2 The Model
In Campbell and Hercowitz (2009b), we considered a general equilibrium economy with two
innitely-lived households, a patient saver and an impatient borrower. Dierences between
their discount rates motivated lending from the saver to the borrower, but borrowing must
be collateralized with durable goods. In that model's steady state, the interest rate equals
the saver's rate of time preference, the collateral requirement limits the borrower's debt, and
equity in durable goods required by loan contracts represents all of the borrower's wealth.
As in Becker (1980)'s analysis of intertemporal trade between households with heterogeneous
discount rates, the saver holds all of the borrower's debt and the economy's other wealth.
Accordingly, we interpret the two households as stand-ins for the wealthy and the home-
owning middle class.1 In this paper, we examine the decision problem of the less-patient
borrower in greater detail, taking as given a constant interest rate that is less than the
household's rate of time preference.2
The model's constraint on household borrowing has two features typical of household loan
contracts in the United States. First, debt collateralized by homes and vehicles is almost 90%
of total household debt.3 Here, we assume that durable goods collateralize all debt. Second,
debt contracts require the borrower to hold an equity stake in the collateralized good. We
use the model to derive the implications of lowering equity requirements.
The household enjoys the consumption of three goods, nondurable consumption (Ct), the
1Renters can be thought of as even more impatient households, who prefer not to hold the equity required
for home ownership. Such renters consume their entire labor income each period, so their labor supply will
be invariant to the wage if they have preferences consistent with balanced growth.
2Holding the interest rate constant is consistent with this paper's stated goals: Explain the operation of
the nancial labor supply accelerator and document evidence for its presence in household-level data.
3Using data from the 2002 Survey of Consumer Finances, Aizcorbe et al. (2003) report that borrowing
collateralized by residential property account for 81:5% of households' debt in 2001 (Table 10), and installment
loans, which include both collateralized vehicle loans and unbacked education and other loans, amounts to
an additional 12:3%. Credit card balances and other forms of debt account for the remainder. The reported
uses of borrowed funds (Table 12) indicate that vehicle debt represents 7:8% of total household debt, and,
hence, collateralized debt (by homes and vehicles) is almost 90% of total household debt.





t f(1   )lnCt + lnSt + ! ln(1   Nt)g:
Here, 0    1 and ! > 0.
The household participates in a labor market, a durable goods market, and a market for
one-period debt. Current nondurable consumption serves as the numeraire in all of them.
The household can sell time in the labor market in return for the wage Wt. This evolves
stochastically and is the sole source of uncertainty in the model. We specify its stochastic
process below. The household can purchase or sell durable goods at the constant price of
1. The household's net durable goods purchases in year t equal St+1   (1   )St. The
household's borrowing in year t for repayment in year t+1 equals Bt+1. The market interest
rate R < 1= is constant over time. Taken together, the household's trades in year t must
satisfy the budget constraint
Ct + RBt + St+1 = WtNt + (1   )St + Bt+1: (1)
In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), producers must collateralize their debts with productive
capital and own part of that capital outright. Similar requirements constrain the debts of
our model household: All debts must be collateralized by durable goods, and borrowers face
a minimum down payment rate . These requirements limit the debt to
Bt+1  (1   )St+1: (2)
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) motivate a similar restriction on producers' debts with a model
of optimal contracting subject to costly repossession. While it is obvious that repossession of
durable goods is also costly, the history of household credit markets reviewed in Campbell and
Hercowitz (2009b) strongly suggests that federal government housing and banking policies
kept minimum down payments high from the end of the Korean War until the early 1980s.
Deregulation expanded access to credit in part by allowing minimum down payments to fall.
Below, we will model this liberalization with an exogenous reduction of .
Note that in principle, there is an indeterminacy in the determination of gross debt. When
the borrowing constraint is slack the household can carry \free wealth" from t to t + 1 by
paying down its debts, by buying securities, or by some combination of these two. In the rst
case, the household holds all of its wealth as equity in its durable goods stock, so its gross debt
equals Bt+1. In the second case, the household sets its borrowing to equal the repossession
5value of its collateral, (1   )St+1. When (2) binds this problem is not present because
these two values are equal. How the household resolves this portfolio indeterminacy has no
bearing on its consumption, wealth, and labor supply decisions; so we proceed assuming that
the household accumulates wealth by paying down its debts. Our specication of the budget
constraint in (1) reects this resolution. 4
The household's choices of consumption, work, and debt maximize utility given its initial
wealth, (1 )S0 RB0, and the sequence of budget and borrowing constraints in (1) and (2).
We denote their corresponding Lagrange multipliers with 	t and 	t t. With this notation,
 t can be interpreted as the rate of return from increasing the stock of available collateral.
Since 	t > 0,  t equals zero when the borrowing constraint is slack and is positive when it
binds. The rst-order necessary conditions and relevant complementary-slackness conditions





















 t  0; (7)
 t((1   )St+1   Bt+1) = 0: (8)
In the standard model with unlimited intertemporal substitution, 	t equals the utility
value of additional lifetime income. Here, 	t measures the utility of additional income re-
ceived in any year between the present and the next time the borrowing constraint binds.5
The borrowing constraint leaves the optimal condition for hours worked in (4) untouched.
The nancial labor supply accelerator operates through the eects of the borrowing constraint
on nondurable consumption.6
4However, the portfolio indeterminacy's resolution does determine which measure of household debt we
compare with the data. We show below that our conclusions from comparing model-generated observations
with data from the PSID are robust to selecting dierent resolutions to this indeterminacy.
5The expectation that a borrowing constraint will bind eectively shortens the household's planning
horizon. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009a) describe the quantitative implications of this situation.
6In Fisher (2007), durable goods complement time spent in the market, and so they directly shift the
6Equation (5) is the rst-order condition for optimal debt. If the borrowing constraint does
not bind in year t, then  t = 0 and (5) reduces to the standard Euler equation. Otherwise,
the collateral value  t equals the Euler equation's violation. Equation (6) characterizes the
optimal purchases of durable goods. If the borrowing constraint does not bind in year t then it
equates the cost of purchasing a durable good to the marginal rate of substitution between Ct
and St+1 plus the purchase's expected discounted resale value. It has a similar interpretation
when the borrowing constraint binds, but the expansion of collateral that accompanies the
purchase lowers the eective price by (1   ) t.7
2.1 Steady State
To place our analysis of short-run uctuations into context, we begin the model's analysis
with the long-run predictions from its steady state given the wage W. These are three: the
borrowing constraint binds, hours worked are invariant to the wage level, and reducing 
raises the household's hours worked.
To see that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the steady state, examine
Equation (5) with 	t = 	t+1.
  = 1   R > 0; (9)
which follows from the assumption of impatience.
The wage has no long-run inuence on hours worked, because the household's preferences
obey the balanced growth restrictions of King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) in which the
income eect of a permanent wage change exactly osets its substitution eect. We obtain
the result as follows. First, replace  t in Equation (6) with its steady state value to get the










+  (1   R)
(10)
\labor supply curve." Our analysis sticks with preferences that are additively separable in durable goods and
hours worked to keep the exposition of the nancial labor supply accelerator as simple as possible.




+  (1   )Et	t+1 + 	t t (1   ):
In utility terms, the price of purchasing this asset equals the standard present value of payos|the rst
two terms on the right hand side|plus its collateral value. The latter is positive only when the Lagrange
multiplier of the collateral constraint is positive. This valuation of a collateralizable asset is basically the
same as in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).
7Raising either the minimum downpayment rate, , or the usual user-cost of durable goods,
(R   1 + )=R, lowers S=C. Second, replace B in the steady state budget constraint with
(1   )S and use (10) to replace S itself with C  S=C. Manipulating the result gives us





1 + [(R   1)(1   ) + ] S
C
(11)










Inspection of (10) and (11) shows that C=(WN) depends on neither W nor N, so N is a
simple function of the model's other parameters. Hence, increasing W leaves N unchanged.
Furthermore, the household's steady-state choices of C, S, and B are all linear in W.
It is also straightforward to derive the implications of lowering  for hours worked. This
reduces the eective price of durable consumption relative to nondurable consumption, so
S=C rises. The budget constraint therefore requires C=(WN) to fall, which (through (12))
raises N. At the same time the reduction of  also induces households to increase B, so the
model predicts that lower required down payments leads to both higher hours worked and
higher debt in the new steady state.
Demographic changes and labor-market innovation undoubtedly inuenced long-run labor
supply in the U.S. However, it is worth noting that hours worked and household debt per U.S.
adult have both a clear upward trend since the time of the nancial deregulation in the early
1980s, which lowered eective down payments. Furthermore, Del Boca and Lusardi (2003)
found that the Italian nancial liberalization of 1992 (which lowered mortgages' minimum
down payments) coincided with expansions of both female labor market participation and
the proportion of households with a mortgage. Hence, the model's long-run predictions are
consistent with the available evidence.
2.2 Financial Factors and Labor Supply
Although the household's borrowing constraint always binds in the nonstochastic steady
state, suciently large shocks (or unusual initial conditions) can cause it to go slack. Household-
level wage uctuations are typically large, so the model's quantitative analysis requires us to
account for the possibility that the borrowing constraint binds only occasionally. Neverthe-
less, we can develop qualitative intuition regarding the nancial labor supply accelerator by
8looking at the household's responses to small shocks that keep its choices near their steady




R   1 + 
R

St = Ct + St+1: (13)
The left-hand side sums two sources of funds, labor earnings and the equity remaining after
selling the durable goods stock and liquidating all debts. The right-hand side has two uses
of funds, nondurable consumption and the required down payments for the purchase of next
year's stock of durable goods. We also rewrite the rst-order necessary condition for optimal















This equates the current resource cost of augmenting the durable goods stock, , with the
marginal rate of substitution between nondurable consumption and the service ow from
durable goods next year plus the discounted expected value of the resulting equity on hand.
The user cost of durable goods is the lowest choice of  that is possibly consistent with
incentive-compatible debt repayment, because then the value of a depreciated durable good
exactly equals the value of the debt. With  at this lower bound, the model's near-steady-
state dynamics are trivial. The two equations above and the labor supply condition in
(4) become a system involving only three unknowns, Ct; St+1 and Nt. The solution leaves
Nt at its steady-state value and has both Ct and St+1 respond proportionally to the wage
change. Intuitively, the household's expenditures are identical to those of one that can rent its
durable goods stock at the user cost. This eectively disconnects the household from capital
markets, and the resulting combination of \rule-of-thumb" consumption behavior (as dened
by Campbell and Mankiw (1989)) with balanced-growth preferences yields no uctuations
in hours worked whether wage shocks are permanent or transitory.8 In this sense, all of our
model's predicted labor supply movements arise from the nancial market imperfections that
raise  above (R   1 + )=R.
The second term on the right-hand side of (13) equals the household's equity in its durable
goods stock. It is positive when  > (R   1 + )=R, so the proportional increase of Ct and
St+1 with Nt remaining constant following a wage increase becomes infeasible. We can gain
intuition for this case by setting  to zero so that Ct=St+1 is constant. The budget constraint
8This situation is similar to that of an unconstrained household with zero assets who faces a permanent
wage change: The substitution and the income eects on labor supply fully cancel each other. Here, this
occurs even if the wage change is temporary.
9then requires both expenditures to rise gradually. The ratio Wt=Ct rises temporarily, so the
labor-supply condition (4) requires Nt to also rise temporarily. This response exemplies the
nancial labor supply accelerator.
3 Quantitative Implications
Further exploration of the model requires a quantitative investigation. For this, we choose
values for the model's parameters to match salient observations from the U.S. economy.
After presenting our calibration choices, we explore the model's dynamics by examining a
household's responses to permanent and transitory wage shocks.
3.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model's parameters proceeds in two steps. First, we choose values
for all parameters but those governing the evolution of wages. In this, we closely follow
Campbell and Hercowitz (2009b). We consider two values for the required downpayment
, 0:16 and 0:11. In that paper, we chose these values to match typical down payments
on home purchases and new cars observed in the Survey of Consumer Finances and Federal
Reserve Statistical Release G-19. The higher number applies to the period before the nancial
deregulation of the early 1980s, and the lower one comes from the years 1995 and later.9 The
rate of durable good depreciation is 4 percent, which is the appropriately weighted average
of depreciation rates for residential structures and vehicles. We set the constant interest
rate to 4 percent, and we set the household's discount rate to approximately 6 percent. We
chose the utility share parameter  to match the household's steady-state expenditure share
on durable goods with the analogous share from the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts.10 The resulting value of  equals 0:40. We set !, the utility parameter on leisure,
so that the household's hours worked in the steady state equal thirty percent of the time
endowment. The resulting value of ! is 2:23.
9Campbell and Hercowitz (2009b) consider the transition between the two regimes from the early 1980s
until the middle 1990s in detail.
10For this, we measure \durable goods expenditure" with the sum of Personal Consumption Expenditure
on Durable Goods and Residential Investment. Total expenditure adds Personal Consumption Expenditures
on Nondurable Goods and Services less Housing Services to this. For the calibration, we chose  so that the
average ratio of durable to nondurable expenditure calculated from 1969 through 1982 matched the value
given by (10). For this, we set  to 0:16. Calibrating  using the analogous procedure with data from the
period following the early 1980's nancial reforms yields very similar results.
10With these parameters set, we can proceed to calculate the model household's optimal
behavior given any stochastic process for the wage. We seek to compare the model's generated
data to observations from the PSID, so we choose the wage process to match features of a
simple model of earnings estimated by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) with those data. It







The permanent component EP follows a random walk with a normally distributed innovation,

















Meghir and Pistaferri obtained these estimates from observations covering 1967 through






















Since the model household's hours worked are invariant to the wage in the long run, the
permanent component of the household's earnings reects lnW P
t . Accordingly, we set 2
P to
the long-run variance of earnings, 0:0313.
We expect uctuations in hours worked to contribute to transitory earnings uctuations,
so we use simulated earnings observations to choose 2
T and . The simulations use the




t 1 and calculates the household's optimal choices given the expectation that no further
wage shocks will occur. These calculations allow the borrowing constraint in (2) to bind only
occasionally. The rst-period choices from this are saved as \data", and the procedure is
11See the rst column of the second panel in their Table III. Since the PSID collects information on the
prior year's labor earnings, these observations correspond to the PSID waves from 1968 through 1993.





0.94 0.04 0.40 0.04 2.23 0.177 0.080 0.412
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
begun again in the next period with the state updated using the calculated choices and the
period's innovations to the wage process.
The calibration itself employs simulations of 2000 households for twenty years. Each of
these starts at the nonstochastic steady state. We discard the rst ten observations. With
the last ten, we calculate transitory earnings as ET
t  lnW T
t + lnNt. We choose 2
T and 
so that the simulations' variance and rst-order autocorrelation match those implied by the
estimates of Meghir and Pistaferri.12 The values of T and  chosen are 0:080 and 0:412.
When combined with a constant labor supply, these parameters yield a transitory earnings
variance equal to about one quarter of our calibration target. Thus, labor supply variation
dominates transitory earnings uctuations in our model.
For reference, Table 1 records the calibrated values of all the model's parameters.
3.2 Responses to Wage Shocks
Our rst use of the calibrated model is to calculate the responses to the calibrated permanent
and transitory wage shocks beginning at the nonstochastic steady state. Since the wage
shocks are \large" and our calculations account for possible nonlinearities in the solution, we
calculated the responses to both positive and negative shocks. Figure 2 plots the calculated
optimal paths of  t, Ct, Bt, and Nt for both values of . That for  t is expressed as 100
times its deviation from steady state. The other three appear as percentage deviations from
the initial steady state. For all simulations, the shock occurs only once, and the household
(rationally) expects no further wage disturbances.
The gure's top panels give the variables' responses to the permanent wage shock, and
the bottom panels correspond to the MA(1) transitory shock. The mechanism studied in
this paper can be best illustrated by the eects of permanent shocks on  t. On impact,
a positive shock increases the multiplier. That is, a permanent wage increase worsens the
liquidity shortage in the short run. This in turn leads to a higher labor supply. Lowering the
12The target variance of ET



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13down-payment rate from 0:16 to 0:11 reduces the need for funds and therefore dampens the
eect of the permanent shock on  t. Changing the sign of the permanent shock generates
responses that are almost mirror images of the originals. This is because the borrowing
constraint always binds in both simulations.
Temporary wage shocks move  t in the opposite direction of their permanent counterparts,
so those simulations embody the standard intuition that borrowing constraints become less
important in good times. A positive shock reduces the multiplier for a number of periods.
Indeed, the calibrated magnitude of the shock is sucient to bring  t to zero. Turning the
borrowing constraint slack shuts o the nancial accelerator, so the size of the down payment
inuences the simulations little.13 The negative temporary shock simultaneously increases  t
and reduces the size of the optimal stock of durable goods. Thus the household repays part
of its debts. The higher ; the larger the amount of funds freed by this repayment, and thus
the weaker is the tightening of the constraint. This is illustrated by the lower graph for  t;
where the multiplier increases less when  = 0:16 than with  = 0:11:14
In the long run, a positive permanent wage shock of one-standard deviation raises St,
Ct, and Bt by 19:4 percentage points. The analogous negative shock lowers these variables
by 16:2 percent in the long run.15 As expected, the debt does not immediately jump to
its new steady state level. Reducing required down payments considerably quickens this
adjustment. The gradual response of Bt and its dependence on  do not depend on the sign
of the permanent shock. In the four simulations with the permanent shocks, the borrowing
constraint always binds, so the evolution of debt mimics that of St. Nondurable consumption
also adjusts gradually. The responses to positive shocks are 17:5 and 18:5 percent with the
high and low values of . This incomplete adjustment manifests itself as a delay in the wage
increase's income eect on labor supply. Hours worked expand 3:7 percent in the period of
the wage increase when  = 0:16, and they return in about two years to their steady-state
value. Lowering  cuts this response in half.
In both of the experiments with positive transitory wage shocks, the borrowing constraint
does not bind for the rst two years. Over this horizon, the household smooths its consump-
13We attribute the small dierences between the simulations to dierences in initial wealth.
14Although it turns the borrowing constraint slack, also the positive temporary shock generates positive
comovement of labor supplied and debt. This is a result of the binding constraint prior to the shock. As
the household's only initial asset is required equity, nancing the desired additional durable goods requires
borrowing. This would be unnecessary, at least partially, for an unconstrained household, i.e., one with
positive free assets.
15The eects of positive and negative shocks have dierent long-run magnitudes because we use exact
percentage-point changes instead of logarithmic deviations.
14tion response and the usual intertemporal substitution eects on labor supply dominate. The
borrowing constraint always binds after the negative transitory wage shocks. The initial wage
is 7:7 percent below its original value, but nondurable consumption only drops 6:2 percent
when  = 0:16 and 7:0 percent when  = 0:11. We interpret this as the household using
some of its home equity to cushion consumption from the wage shock. When there is more
home equity, the cushion is larger. Since consumption responds less, hours worked respond
more. They decrease by 3:7 percent when down payments are high and  1:5 percent when
down payments are low.
One might suspect that simulations of the model beginning at its nonstochastic steady
state do not represent the model's behavior well, because the calibrated wage process features
large shocks. We examined this speculation with 2000 simulated household histories for each
down-payment regime. We used the durable goods stock, debt, and lagged transitory shock
from each simulation's rst year (following the 10 pre sample years) as initial conditions
for the calculation of the impulse responses reported in Figure 2. Averaging the resulting
responses across simulations yields Figure 3, which shares Figure 2's format. The similarity
between the two gures is remarkable. Apparently, the nonstochastic steady state is indeed
somewhat \typical" of the model's ergodic distribution.16
4 Comovement of Hours with Mortgage Debt
As shown earlier in Figure 1, aggregate hours worked and household debt (a) comove pos-
itively in general, and (b) this comovement weakens after the early 1980s|a period cor-
responding to lower down payments. The model's impulse responses in Figures 2 and 3
are consistent with the aggregate evidence: Shocks to the current wage move both hours
worked and debt in the same direction, and lowering the required down payment weakens
the response of hours more than that of debt. Given the importance of this pattern for
the relevance of the nancial labor supply accelerator, we investigate here the presence of
a similar comovement at the household level with PSID panel data. We then compare the
empirical ndings with corresponding results from the model's articial data.
We carried out this investigation estimating the following descriptive regression with the
16To examine this issue further, we calculated the percentage of periods in the calibration simulations in
which the borrowing constraint binds and the household's average free wealth given that it is slack. For both
values of , the constraint binds in about 31 percent of the periods. However, the average free wealth given
that it is slack equals only about 4 percent of the household's current wage. In this sense, the household





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Here, the variables refer to household i in year t: Ni
t is hours worked, Di
t+1 is debt at the
beginning of the following year, W i
t 1 represents the hourly wage in the previous year, and Xi
t
is a vector of control variables. We measure Ni
t by summing the Head's and Wife's reports of
annual hours in the calendar year prior to the interview in year t+1. We use the Head's wage,
constructed by dividing reported earnings by reported hours worked, as W i
t. Mortgage debt
at the time of the interview is the only measure of household liabilities consistently present
in the PSID. We interpret this as an \end-of-period" stock of debt that reects the previous
year's work, consumption, and saving decisions. We represent this measure of household debt
with \D" rather than\ B" to emphasize that the resolution of the portfolio indeterminacy
we assumed when developing the model does not necessarily characterize the data.
The intercept t varies over calendar time to control for macroeconomic uctuations, and
the vector of individual-specic control variables Xi
t accounts demographic dierences across
households.
The key variable on the right-hand side of (15) is Di
t+1=(1000  W i
t 1).17 This expresses
the household's debt in thousands of hours of work. In the impulse response functions of
Figures 2 and 3, shocks to the current wage moved both debt and hours worked in the same
direction. Therefore, we expect t to be positive. Lowering the required downpayment rate
reduced the response of hours disproportionally more than that of debt, so we also expect
estimates of t to be lower for dates after the nancial reforms of the 1980s. The time-varying
intercept (t) accounts for shocks that are common to all households, so the estimates of t
do not embody the comovement of aggregate hours worked and household debt displayed in
Figure 1.
4.1 Sample Selection
The model describes the decisions of a middle-class household with labor market participa-
tion, a substantial stock of leveraged durable goods, and a long planning horizon. So that
our sample households are more likely to satisfy these assumptions, we exclude households
with either
17We use Wi
t 1 instead of Wi
t in (15) because measurement errors in hours worked can generate a spurious




17Sample Available Years Observations Households
Annual 1969{1997 34,164 5,311
Complete 1970{2005 37,292 6,119
Table 2: PSID Sample Sizes
 income from dividends and interest in the current survey's top two percentiles,
 total market work in the previous year less than 1000 hours,
 no mortgage debt in both the current and previous surveys, or
 a Head (as dened in Hill (1992)) under 20 years old or over 50 years old.
Since the model abstracts from life-cycle events such as marriage and divorce, we also require
two adults to be present in each of our sample's household-year observations. To mitigate
the eects of measurement errors on our results, we excluded observations in which
 either adult's annual hours worked exceeded 4000,
 either adult's measured hourly wage is less than half the current Federal Minimum
Wage, or
 either adult's measured hourly wage exceeds $2,000.
Each observation we use has information on hours worked and mortgage debt. Addition-
ally, we require our sample's observations to have information on the Head's age, race, and
educational status.
The data covers the period 1968 to 2005. From its inception through 1997, PSID surveys
occurred annually. We refer to the resulting set of observations as the annual PSID. There-
after, the survey has been biennial, and we call the observations including these later years
the complete PSID. To estimate (15) with the complete PSID, we replace the once-lagged
wage with the twice-lagged wage. Table 2 reports the number of observations and households
in both samples after applying all of our selection criteria.
4.2 Empirical Results
We estimate t in (15) using the Annual PSID observations with two specications for the
control variables in Xi
t. In the random eects specication, dummies for the Head's age,
18Table 3: Estimates of t in (15) from the Annual PSID
1969{1979 1980{1989 1990{1997
Random Eects 53 56 31
(8) (5) (4)
Fixed Eects 22 27 9
(6) (4) (3)
Note: For this table, all observations of households' mortgage debts were scaled by the household head's
once-lagged wage. Please see the text for further details.
Table 4: Estimates of t in (15) from the Complete PSID
1970{1979 1980{1989 1990{1999 2001{2005
Random Eects 55 47 33 26
(6) (5) (3) (3)
Fixed Eects 30 21 11 7
(5) (4) (3) (4)
Note: For this table, all observations of households' mortgage debts were scaled by the household head's
twice-lagged wage. Please see the text for further details.
race, and educational attainment make up Xi
t. The xed eects specication replaces the
race and educational attainment dummies with household-specic dummies. In both cases,
we restrict t to be constant over three time intervals, 1969{1979, 1980{1989, and 1990{1997.
Table 3 reports the estimates of t and their standard errors. Table 4 contains analogous
estimates for the complete PSID. For these, we require t to be constant over 1970{1979,
1980{1989, 1990{1999, and 2000-2005.
The results in the two tables are similar, so we focus our discussion on the longer sample
in Table 4. Over 1971-1979, the estimated random-eects slope equals 55. That is, a 1;000
hour increase in mortgage debt (equal to the annual income from a half-time job) is associated
with a 55 hour increase in labor supply. The analogous coecient for the 1980s was basically
unchanged, but the coecients for the 1990's and 2000's are much lower, 33 and 26. Table 1
in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009b) shows that average down payments for home purchases
declined substantially only after 1992, so the coecients declined at about the same time as
down payments fell. Replacing the Head's race and education indicators' with household-
19Table 5: Estimates of t and (A) in (16) from the Annual PSID
30  Age  39 Adjustment for Age
1969{1979 1980{1989 1990{1997  29  40
Random Eects 57 59 36 3 -12
(8) (6) (5) (7) (6)
Fixed Eects 22 28 14 15 -11
(6) (4) (4) (6) (5)
Note: For this table, all observations of households' mortgage debts were scaled by the household head's
once-lagged wage. Please see the text for further details.
Table 6: Estimates of t and (A) in (16) from the Complete PSID
30  Age  39 Adjustment for Age
1970{1979 1980{1989 1990{1999 2001{2005  29  40
Random Eects 52 45 32 25 8 0
(7) (6) (4) (4) (5) (4)
Fixed Eects 22 17 10 8 22 -2
(6) (4) (3) (4) (5) (4)
Note: For this table, all observations of households' mortgage debts were scaled by the household head's
twice-lagged wage. Please see the text for further details.
specic xed eects substantially reduces the coecients | the estimated coecient for the
1970s equals 30 | but their decline with time remains. Thus, the later part of our sample,
which coincides with a period of low down payments, displays a weaker relationship between
hours worked and debt.18
Although we have omitted households with older heads (so that households have \long"
planning horizons) and have controlled directly for age, one might nevertheless suspect that
18Since dierencing within households raises any measurement error's relative contribution to total vari-
ance, the discrepancies between the random-eects and xed-eects estimates could arise from measurement
error. With this in mind, we have experimented with instrumental variables estimation of the xed-eects
specication using lagged right-hand side variables as instruments. These will be valid so long as the mea-
surement errors are uncorrelated across time for a given household. Although these IV estimates share the
sign and declining pattern of those in Figures 3 and 4, they are implausibly large and have very high standard
errors.
20the empirical relationship between hours worked and debt varies by age. To investigate this,
we expand (15) to interact debt with the household head's age. That is
N
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t denotes the Head's age and (A) is an age-specic adjustment to the relationship
between household debt and hours worked. For estimation, we constrained (A) to be
constant across the three age groups in our sample, 20{29, 30{39, and 40{49, and we achieve
identication by constraining it to equal zero for Heads in their 30's. Tables 5 and 6 report
the results.
Both regression specications applied to both samples indicate that households in the 20's
have the strongest comovement of hours worked and debt and that households in their 40's
display the weakest eects. This pattern might reect a concentration of home purchases
among the young, but it is not statistically signicant in all specications. Overall, the
estimated eects for households with Heads in their 30's resemble the estimates in Tables 3
and 4. We conclude from this that the household-level comovement between hours worked
and debt diers little across young and middle-aged groups.19
4.3 Comparison with Model-Generated Observations
The comparison of these results with our model proceeds as follows. We begin with simula-
tions of 2000 households starting at the nonstochastic steady state for 20 years holding  at
0:16. Using the same sequences of household-level shocks, we generate analogous simulations
with  at 0:11. After discarding the rst ten years of each simulation, we estimate ordinary
least squares and xed-eects regressions analogous to those reported in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 7 reports the results.
As noted earlier, the proper measure of gross household debt when the borrowing con-
straint does not bind depends on the shares of debt repayment and security purchases in
wealth accumulation. To evaluate the robustness of the results to the particular resolution of
this portfolio indeterminacy, we use two distinct measures of household debt. The rst fol-
lows from the resolution we employed when describing the model, Dt+1 = Bt+1. The second
19When we expanded our sample to include households with heads between 51 and 65 years old, we found
that these estimates of (A) were positive and both economically and statistically signicant. Since retirement
and the end of life are important considerations for these households, understanding this surprising nding
seems to require a life-cycle model with these features. Accordingly, its explanation lies beyond the present
paper. In any case, our main empirical results change little if we include these older households in our
estimation sample.
21Ordinary Least Squares
Dt+1  = 0:16  = 0:11
Bt+1=Wt 1 57 30
(1   )St+1=Wt 1 63 35
Bt+1=Wt 2 43 25
(1   )St+1=Wt 2 45 27
Fixed Eects
Dt+1  = 0:16  = 0:11
Bt+1=Wt 1 54 29
(1   )St+1=Wt 1 62 35
Bt+1=Wt 2 42 25
(1   )St+1=Wt 2 46 28
Table 7: Model-based Regression Coecients
sets gross household debt at the repossesion value of available collateral, Dt+1 = (1 )St+1.
For each of these, Table 7 reports results for the two scaling options we used above, Wt 1
and Wt 2.
From Table 7 we conclude the following. First, the two resolutions of the portfolio in-
determinacy give very similar results. Second, the coecients obtained when  = 0:16 are
remarkably close to the random-eects estimates from the 1970s and 1980s. That is, the
calibrated model reproduces the observed comovement of household debt and hours worked
from those decades. Finally, lowering  to 0:11 reduces the estimated coecient by 17 to 27
hours. This matches the actual reduction from the 1970s and 1980s to the 1990s and 2000s
well. Since our calibration used no information on the comovement between hours worked
and debt, we nd this similarity between the model and data remarkable.
5 Macroeconomic Implications and Concluding Remarks
In the mechanism studied here, households wish to expand their stocks of durable goods fol-
lowing a persistent wage increase, but they lack the funds for the required minimum equity
stakes. We label the resulting increase in labor supply \the nancial labor supply acceler-
ator." This diers from the usual nancial accelerator applying to rms. There, it is an
22increase in the availability of funds which induces constrained rms to expand economic ac-
tivity. This dierence is due to the margin households face and rms do not: The allocation
of time across activities generating funds or utility. A shortage of funds induces constrained
households to give up leisure. In a macro model where both rms and households face liquid-
ity constraints, positive productivity shocks are likely to produce simultaneously an increase
in the availability of funds to the rms, and a shortage of funds for the households|via
equity requirements. Hence, it seems that the present and the standard nancial accelerators
operate in the same direction. The positive interaction between these two mechanisms seems
to be a promising subject for further study.
The labor supply accelerator works by tightening the collateral constraint, and so delay-
ing the income eect of a wage increase. This allows the substitution eect to dominate in
the short run. This eect is stronger the higher the need for funds for down payment require-
ments. In a standard model of nancially unconstrained households, such a wage change
would produce little or no change in hours worked.
The main macroeconomic implication of this paper is the possible link between the present
mechanism and macroeconomic volatility, and in particular with the \great moderation"
from the early 1980s until August 2007. The role of nancial innovation for explaining this
phenomenon through rms' nancial considerations was addressed recently by Jerman and
Quadrini (2009). They focus on increased exibility in equity nancing as the mechanism
generating greater stability. We focus on reforms of the household credit markets which
eectively reduce equity requirements. With lower equity requirements, productivity shocks
generate smaller labor supply responses by collateral constrained households, and thus more
moderate aggregate uctuations. We explored this channel using a general equilibrium frame-
work in Campbell and Hercowitz (2006), and we are continuing that investigation presently.
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